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by 
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Arrangements whereby host countries receive infrastructure “now” in exchange for access to 
natural resources in the future have received a great deal of criticism, generally based on few 
data.1 Although Chinese investments in Africa have dominated discussions, some Korean and 
Western firms are considering similar deals to remain competitive. Because most contracts are 
secret, many commentators are inevitably skeptical of the benefits to the host country -- maybe 
wrongly. 
 
In fact, the concepts underlying recent agreements are not so new. Developing countries have 
long received assets upfront for rights to resources in the future. For example, in 1926 Firestone 
arranged a loan to free Liberia from British debt and received a concession for rubber 
plantations. Host governments have frequently obtained cash at the outset under the benign name 
of “signing bonuses.” Examples include Mittal Steel in Liberia (2007) and oil agreements around 
the world. In at least one case, the asset was mercenary services (Sierra Leone, 1995), with 
diamond concessions going to an affiliate of the mercenaries. 
 
Today the investor may arrange a package comprising financing and construction of major 
infrastructure unrelated, or only loosely related, to the mine (or plantation), while the host 
government simultaneously grants exploitation rights to the investor.  Each part of the deal might 
appear to be independent, but one is conditional on the other. Importantly, the scale of upfront 
payments may have increased, but the deals are otherwise only a twist on earlier agreements. 
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 For an effort to measure such investments, see, Vivien Foster, et al., “Building bridges: China’s growing role as 
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2008). 
 2 
Of course, the host country eventually pays for the infrastructure. Explicit debt service is 
straightforward, but obligations might also include pledged revenue from extraction; 
arrangements can also, less explicitly, provide repayment in the form of reduced fiscal 
obligations for the investor; and even less explicitly, they might include higher-than-market costs 
for the infrastructure. Whatever the details, conceptually the deals involve loans: an asset now 
for payments in the future. 
 
The arrangements can provide benefits to the host country. Importantly, they ensure that a 
country converts part of the revenue from a depleting resource into productive capital assets -- 
infrastructure -- instead of mainly increasing consumption, as often happens with signing 
bonuses or royalties. They may also short-cut slow government processes that otherwise slow 
constructing infrastructure. Some countries have used the deals to avoid external borrowing 
restrictions. And lower capital costs available to some Asian firms may lead to favorable loan 
terms. Like signing bonuses, infrastructure can also provide one solution to another problem: 
Capturing resource rents when fiscal terms are set by law and do not include a resource rent tax. 
 
The obvious cost, of course, is debt service in the future. Interest, principal and explicit 
reductions in fiscal obligations of the miner are clear. Additional costs may be more hidden and 
difficult to measure: Higher charges for infrastructure not openly tendered, poor supervision over 
its quality, and mismatches between investors’ offers and what is actually needed. 
 
A government considering an offer of infrastructure for natural resources should begin with 
calculations that compare the costs and benefits to alternatives. Initial calculations are 
straightforward, but require some reasonable assumptions about the fiscal revenues and signing 
bonuses from the resource and the cost of infrastructure absent the tied arrangements. The results 
should be converted to an implied interest rate for the “loan” and compared to alternatives, such 
as costs for independent borrowing for infrastructure and “market” fiscal terms for mines. The 
results may favor the arrangements or show them to be costly. 
 
Calculations rarely capture everything that matters. Here, important omissions would be gains 
from assurance that revenues from resource wealth are converted into productive assets and 
likely speedier completion of projects, but also the possible costs of lower quality or less desired 
infrastructure. Although calculations are imperfect decision tools, they are valuable. Doing the 
arithmetic at least identifies any costs that must be balanced against such non-quantifiable 
benefits. 
 
Foreign investors should also worry about long-term arrangements that provide host countries a 
large portion of benefits upfront. History suggests that subsequent governments often forget 
early benefits and see only resources leaving the country with little payment at the time. The 
outcome can be demands for renegotiation. To be sure, the increasing bite of international 
arbitration appears to provide more protection to investors than they had in the past. Yet, turning 
to arbitration is likely to end an investor’s involvement in the project, sour relations for other 
opportunities in the country and frustrate the investor’s (or its home government’s) goal of 
protecting access to minerals or crops. Perhaps there are good reasons, beyond capital costs and 
availability, that explain why arrangements with large upfront “payments” are being struck 
mainly by Asian investors with little experience in overseas extractive activities in risky 
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countries. Maybe experienced Western investors have been reluctant to imitate their competitors 
because they understand these political risks from their own history. 
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